Speak soft but carry a large stick: Hard power versus soft power

President Theodore Roosevelt’s advice regarding diplomacy was this: speak soft, but carry a large stick.

Of course, he was adding his own corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, posed by President James Monroe in 1823 and authored by the Secretary of State at the time, John Quincy Adams.

For those who do not know, a transcript of the Monroe Doctrine can be read here: http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=23&page=transcript. If English isn’t your first language, it might be a little difficult, because it’s older, more formal English. (As a former English teacher, I still recommend trying to see what you get out of it!) In short, it is one of the longest-enduring tenets of American foreign policy, stating that any European power that attempts to colonize North or South America will be viewed as an act of war against the U.S. that will result in U.S. (military) intervention.

But because of its association with a controversial aspect of U.S. foreign policy, I’m not sure if people realize just how insightful that President Roosevelt’s saying is.

What good ol’ Teddy was saying is that in approaching interactions and negotiations with other nations, soft power is needed at the forefront, with hard power to back it up.

What are hard and soft power? Heck, what is power?

Today’s discussion will be on the concept of power in international politics. Then these ideas of power will be applied to a real-life situation, so that you might understand and see better just how big of a role power has in both domestic and foreign politics.

What is power?

“Power” is a term we hear so often every day. But what is it, exactly?

There are tons and tons of definitions for it. I can’t possibly name them all here. Like sovereignty, it is such a big topic that numerous articles and even books have been written about it. Let’s name some examples of definitions that have been given for “power”: economic wealth, military might, inspiration, influence, respect…

These are all correct to a degree. But that doesn’t exactly tell us much, does it? It gives an idea of how power might manifest or be facilitated, but it doesn’t really say what it is.

Let’s take a moment to look at how physicists define power. A unit of power is equal to one joule per second. A joule is a unit of energy that measures how much energy is used or expended in applying a force of 1 newton. In turn, a newton is a unit of force, with 1 newton equal to 1 kg-m/second squared.

My physics background is limited (my science background mostly lies in chemistry and biology, as I started my college education as a biochemistry major), but I learned this in basic physics in high school.

So to make a long story short, power is energy transfer over time. And what is energy?

If you said something along the lines of “the capacity to do work”, give yourself a gold star.

Put another way, then, power is the ability to refocus energy in order to get work done.

I’d say this definition of power applies fairly well to international relations in a more abstract way. Those considered to be the most powerful nations are often seen to have the ability to accomplish their interests.

(At this point, I’ve decided I’m going to add a definitions page to this blog.)

But now the example definitions listed earlier make more sense; many confuse “power” with “instruments of power”.

What makes one state more “powerful” than another? What gives them that edge, that ability to refocus energy achieve their interests?

I’m not sure about the international relations experts in the academic world—do not get me wrong, I am not an expert (yet), that is a long time in coming and this blog is but a fun hobby for me—but in my humble opinion, I think it is due to the full set of “internal priorities” of a state, based on what I will call its “internal structure”—this is my definition of a state’s “position”. By internal structure, I mean a combination of geography, demographics, political/governmental type, form, and structure, and overall standard of living; it is what makes an individual state unique. Internal structure provides many choices for a country’s internal priorities. Of course, that does not mean that it will result in anything positive, useful or effective; in fact, it is often the case that states do not make such choices in priorities. In the study of political science in general, no matter what level you look at, the human element is often forgotten, overlooked, or simply underestimated. Governments are made by and of people; the psyche and personal circumstances of these individuals cause them to have their own priorities and interests, which frequently get reflected in a state’s priority set.

The priority set, according to my definition, of any one state is enormous: it is the aggregate of priorities of the state as a whole, not simply those of the government in authority. Of course, the government often influences the priorities of its constituents in one way or another.

The power of a state lies in the ability to redirect energy towards the use of any instrument of power in order to obtain a certain goal. These instruments include things like economic wealth, military might, social/interpersonal connections, information, technology, ideas, innovation, and education.

These things, in turn, are put into two classifications: hard and soft power.

Hard power is almost always the use of a tangible instrument of power, usually economic wealth or military might. It is visible, countable, measurable in some way. Soft power, on the other hand, is very different; generally, it is the use of intangible, more subtle instruments: good interpersonal connections that can result in favors, persuasion, the spread of ideas, general influence.

It isn’t always easy to determine whether an instrument is one of hard or soft power. Take information, for example. Because information can be recorded and is therefore tangible, some argue it is more of a hard power instrument. But information can also be hidden 0r used for persuasion, which would possibly put it in the soft power category.

Keep in mind, these are simplistic definitions; the study of power is much more complex and the lines aren’t always clear between hard and soft power.

When Teddy Roosevelt stated to “speak soft and carry a big stick”, he was using a reference to hard and soft power. Because soft power is not as tangible, states, in their appraisal of each other as help or hindrance in achieving their own interests, it is not considered as “important” or “effective” as hard power. Therefore, he advised backing soft power with hard power so that the intangible will be lent substance by something tangible, since the human mind tends to lend more importance to what is verifiable with the senses. (That’s a whole philosophical discussion in itself, one not to be held here. Not today.)

Power: There’s an app for that

Let’s take a look at the use of power and apply it to the real world. I came upon an article written back in February 2012 by current Russian president Vladimir Putin. He served as Russian president from 2000 – 2008, as prime minister from 2008 to 2012, and was elected as president again back in March of this year. I had the opportunity to view both parliamentary and presidential elections in Russia during my Fulbright grant. There were many very interesting developments. I hope to write about it sometime in another post.

The article is titled as “Быть сильными: гарантии национальной безопасности для России” [“Being Strong: Guarantees of National Security for Russia”].

In any case, here is the article in English. It is much, much shorter than the Russian version (even the title has been reduced to simply “Being Strong”), but it will give you enough to be able to see:

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/21/being_strong?page=0,0

The Russian version, for those of you who know the language, can be found here. If you can read Russian, I highly recommend it:

http://www.rg.ru/2012/02/20/putin-armiya.html

Right of the bat, you can tell a lot from the title. The use of the phrase “national security” indicates physical security and guarantees discussion of Russia’s military strength. So the focus is on hard power. By equating “being strong” with “national security”, it demonstrates Putin’s mentality that hard power is what makes a state strong, rather than soft power.

The second and third paragraphs on the first page of the English version are very revealing:

“It is no surprise that some are calling for resources of global significance to be freed from the exclusive sovereignty of a single nation. This cannot happen to Russia, not even hypothetically.

In other words, we should not tempt anyone by allowing ourselves to be weak. We will, under no circumstances, surrender our strategic deterrent capability. Indeed, we will strengthen it.”

Not surprising to have such fighting words from a veteran Russian leader and former KGB agent. Putin (Russians in general, for that matter) does not mince words. He is very clear: Russia will defend its physical resources in the interest of developing the economy as a whole by taking some of those resources, putting innovative minds to work, and using the two to strengthen Russia’s military to secure it.

It is hardly a surprise that the focus is on hard power and the tangible power instruments that go with its use. Russia is a resource-rich country that for many, many years has had an economic and political habit of concentrating resources to a few key players and forcing distribution. I’m talking even before the advent of communism and the rise of the USSR and certainly after the fall of the Soviet Union.  It has resulted in uneven economic development through the different regions of the country. When you look at a city like Moscow and compare it to a city in Siberia like Krasnoyarsk (admittedly, much smaller than Moscow with a population of about 1,000,000), the difference is clear. Krasnoyarsk is developing fairly rapidly, but it is nowhere near Moscow on that front. (Despite that, I am not a fan of Moscow. I love Krasnoyarsk, which I consider my Russian home.)

This is an example of what I mean when I am talking about how a state’s position is determined by the relationship between internal priorities and internal structure. Here is another one, from the Russian version of the article (not shown in the English version):

“Приоритет: Важно обеспечить встречные потоки инноваций, технологий между ‘оборонным’ и ‘гражданским’ секторами.” [“Priority: It is important to provide counter flows of innovations and technology between defense and civilian sectors.”]

This is a really interesting policy, putting a link between defense research and development (R&D) and civilian R&D. It is common for there to be a large time gap in between the advent of military technology and innovations and the time that they find some use in the public market. Assuming such a policy will truly be upheld, it will do a lot of good for Russia; it will mean that investment in one sector could lead to innovations in the other. Talk about getting more bang for your buck. Or, in this case, your ruble. (A ruble today is worth about $0.03.) On top of that, with Russia’s incentives built into the higher education system for getting students into science, engineering, and technology career fields, innovation may not be long in coming. (In the U.S., public universities are funded by the state governments; in Russia, the federal government does the funding.)

(And for the record, for those who might be wondering about the intellectual property rights implications of such a policy…Russia doesn’t care. Really. I found no music stores with newly released albums because everyone downloads music for free online. And academic plagiarism is rampant in the universities—at least, until the last year when they have to write a thesis. But that’s just the way it is.)

But think about this: with a link like that between the civilian and defense sectors, think of how easy it would be for Russia to shift focus from one to the other according to short-term and/or long-term need. Mobilization of the military, complete with advanced equipment, could be incredibly rapid (not a small feat for a country of that size). And then when the need for a larger military ends, it would be easy to redirect focus on the civilian sector.

That ability to refocus, ladies and gentlemen, is power. In this case, hard power.

Will the imbalance between hard and soft power work for Russia in the long term? There is no real telling at this point, but I do believe in a certain kind of balance. Intimidation in efforts to deter others from taking undesirable actions with overt uses of hard power do not generally make for many allies—and who knows when Russia will need allies in the future. Not to say Russia does not have allies now, but its always better to have more than less…