What about the rest of us? Gun control, lessons from abroad, and the endless tirade of a minority

Gun control.

This is an issue I have been wanting to cover for a while. It has a lot of personal meaning to me.

Even if you do not live in the U.S., I’m fairly certain you’re aware of the gun control debate that is raging in the country right now. I want to cover this, so that you can understand a little better what exactly is going on and go into why it is such a huge issue.

Let me begin by stating my bias on this issue: I do not like guns. I think gun control is a necessity — if done properly, of course.

I do not like guns for a lot of reasons. First and foremost, someone very close to me, my closest friend in the world, took her life with a gun nearly three and a half years ago. Studies have shown that suicides are more likely to occur if there is a firearm in the home. (While someone might argue that’s correlation, not causation, I will point out that such studies show that suicides, with a gun in the home, are more likely going to be carried through using that gun.) On top of that, I became aware of the impact of the danger guns pose as a young girl. When I was in the third grade, a girl at my school was accidentally shot and killed by her older sister while they were playing alone at home. Second, guns are used to harm and kill. They are long range weapons. Once you pull the trigger, you have no control over where the bullet goes. (Yes, I know, there’s a thing called aiming. There’s also a thing called ricochet. And bad aim. And an attitude of “I don’t care who I hurt” and even “I want to kill everyone”.) Third, in the wrong hands, it ruins lives. Guns are easily passed from person to person—as many weapons are—but they are easily mastered, even by children. Ever heard of child soldiers? In many conflicts, children are forced into war, inducted violently into one side or another (many wars have more than two parties involved)—and given guns and cutting weapons like knives and machetes to continue the process. (That’s a topic for another post.)

Despite my biases, I won’t advocate trying to take away people’s right to own a gun. Several reasons: 1) It’s in the U.S. Constitution for a reason, though I feel the NRA and their ilk’s absolutist interpretation is extremely outdated. 2) Not everyone who has a gun is violent with it. Some use them for sport or hunting or even just decoration. This is okay with me. 3) Guns can be used to protect. However, this issue is a little more murky, which we’ll discuss later. 4) Guns are weapons, just like knives, swords, and bows and arrows. I myself own several swords (2 katanas, 2 tai chi swords, a wakazashi, a wooden sword, and a bamboo bokken), a bo staff, and a pair of sai. I use them for practice as a long-time martial artist. I wouldn’t want someone taking those from me.

Now having put that out there, let’s look at the gun control debate and what is happening now.

The Great Gun Debate: The American Version

What triggered this whole thing?

In order to understand the U.S. version of the debate, you need to know about its origin relative to the U.S. We need to dig a little bit into U.S. history to see this properly.

Before the American Revolution, during the colonial period in the 16th through 18th centuries, guns were an absolute necessity for anyone and everyone who settled here. They were the main instrument for protecting oneself and one’s family. They were also necessary for hunting. Settlement involved venturing into territory with unknown dangers—hostile Native Americans (in my opinion, they were rightfully hostile, as people took over their land with no thought of how it affected them, the original inhabitants), wild animals, outlaws, thieves, bandits.

On the eve of the Revolution, guns took on a greater political importance. They were the main weapon of choice for the revolutionaries/rebels defending against the oppression of the British monarchy. American lore relating to the Revolution frequently refers to “the shot heard ’round the world”, a phrase taken from Ralph Waldo Emerson’s 1837 poem “Concord Hymn” about the Battle of Concord, the first battle of the American Revolution. At the time, towns in the North American British Colonies had their own militias made up of armed “minutemen” who lived in the locality; there was no true centralized military made of Americans until the organization of the Revolution.

In 1789, six years after winning the Revolutionary War and two years after the writing of the U.S. Constitution, the Bill of Rights was drafted. The Bill of Rights consists of the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution. It states mainly what the federal government may not do in governing the people as a way to protect various rights: freedom of speech and religion, the right to fair and speedy trial, and—relevant to our discussion—the right to bear arms.

The Second Amendment states:

“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”

For those of you whose first language isn’t English, this is slightly archaic and very formal language, so let me simplify it: “A well regulated Militia [a small, non-central army with a set of rules to govern them], being necessary to the security of a free State [militias are needed to protect the country], the right of the people to keep and bear Arms [the people of the U.S. have a right to own guns], shall not be infringed [the right cannot be taken away by the government]”. In one sentence: “Militias are necessary to keep our country safe, so the government cannot take away the people’s right to own and possess guns.”

The problem is that times have changed. Since the Second Amendment was written, the country has evolved and altered socially, economically, geographically, in infrastructure, and technologically. There is a large, centralized military for national security (“the security of a free State”); for this reason, militias have essentially disappeared.

Constitutions are documents that are supposed to be somewhat vague so that they can be flexibly interpreted and applied over time, but even the Founding Fathers could not foresee some of the changes that have occurred. They predicted and warned against many of them—these predictions can mostly be found in a series of essays called The Federalist Papers. (A warning to my readers who are not native English speakers: If your English is not advanced, The Federalist Papers will be very difficult to read. The language is formal 18th century American English, which is not the same as 21st century English—some of the use of punctuation and capitalization is different. Even many native speakers have a hard time understanding them. There are also a lot of them, so it would take a long time to read. On the other hand, if you like a challenge, by all means try! They are fascinating documents.)

I bring up the issue of interpretation because this is the crux of the issue. There are many Americans who interpret the Second Amendment very literally word for word and believe it should be carried out as it is written (a style of interpretation called “absolutist”). Others are much more loose with interpretation, which means that they take into account the ambiguity of the words. I tend to follow this second method of interpreting, because law is supposed to have some vagueness in order to account for changes over time. The Founding Fathers were aware of this.

To summarize, many Americans feel that gun control is a way to take away their Second Amendment right to bear arms, while others believe that it is mandated by the Second Amendment to have gun control.

Against gun control 

Those against gun control most often use the absolutist interpretation of the Second Amendment to defend their position. Due to this, they believe that any restrictions regarding gun ownership is unconstitutional, ranging from the type of gun (i.e. assault rifles should not be regulated) to the size of the magazine (the number of bullets the gun can hold) to the size of the bullets used. The National Rifle Association (NRA), before the 2012 presidential election, released this fact sheet about on Obama’s gun policies. If you read carefully, the general focus is on protecting the Second Amendment.

They assert that guns are effective in protecting oneself and others: “The only way to stop a bad guy with a gun is a good guy with a gun.” This point has some validity. Generally, trying to use diplomacy to talk down an armed person hellbent on violence for some motive or another is difficult, often impossible. It doesn’t imply that the good guy has to kill the bad guy, per se, simply incapacitate.

Another frequent argument of the gun control opposition is that “Guns don’t kill people, people kill people”. Why regulate something inanimate?

Some experts argue that by creating restrictions, it opens the way to a black market, the same way that making abortions and drugs illegal just drive people to take extreme measures to get them, making them all the more dangerous. On top of that, criminals don’t follow the law—that’s what makes them criminals.

For gun control 

I have already explained my biases, which should give you some idea of why I am for gun control. But I want to go into a bit more depth. Even if I can’t persuade those who are against it, I hope they can at least understand why I take this position. My reasons aren’t uncommon.

I absolutely think that gun control is necessary due to the nature of guns. Gun control is NOT the same as taking away guns from the general populace. Guns are weapons, but they are not like other weapons. Take a look at how they developed. As I pointed out before, they are long range and often easily concealed. And I do not think that assault rifles are necessary for anyone to own. Their sole purpose is to kill. They are not used for sport and, frankly, they are rather impractical for protecting your family at home. And how many times have you heard about someone robbing a bank with a sword or taser? There’s a good chance you haven’t. Most of all, many of our gun laws are outdated. The Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, if interpreted in an absolutist fashion, renders it into an outdated mandate, as I pointed out earlier. This commercial illustrates that point nicely.

I find that many Americans only pay attention to one part of the Second Amendment, the second half: “…the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” This is somewhat understandable, seeing as militias aren’t exactly around anymore. But this is where I have yet another problem with absolutist interpreters of the Second Amendment: I find it hypocritical to ignore the first half. If you claim to interpret literally or even based on what the Founding Fathers had intended in writing it, then you will agree that there should still be militias and that it should be WELL REGULATED, meaning that there are RULES and RESTRICTIONS governing the ownership and possession of guns.

It’s in the Constitution, isn’t it?

(Of course, I will grant that it is possible to be interpret the Second Amendment loosely by ignoring the first half and attaching all meaning to the second half. But most of those against gun control don’t see themselves as interpreting loosely. They see themselves interpreting it absolutely and literally.)

And I recently overheard someone make a good point: No one complains about regulating driving and driver’s licenses—this is something regulated by government. What makes guns so different?

Let me go back to the NRA fact sheet that I provided a link to earlier in this discussion. There are a ton of flaws and biases in it. (It is not unusual for the NRA to spread misinformation.) For example, look at the claim that Obama would use the UN’s arms treaty (which was passed on April 2nd of this year by the UN General Assembly) to circumvent the Second Amendment. This is not true, nor could it ever be true, for two reasons: 1) This is only for ILLEGAL arms trade and 2) this is not, I repeat, NOT how international law works. International law does not work the same way as federal or state law. In a (very simplified) nutshell, when a state agrees to abide by an international treaty, it is up to the state to internalize the mandate of that treaty by creating its own laws based on the treaty’s terms and/or mechanisms for enforcement. Even if a state signs on to a treaty, the legislative body of that state may choose not to ratify it (look at what happened to the Treaty of Versailles after World War I—the U.S. signed on to it, but Congress failed to ratify it, which nullified U.S. participation). Or the legislative body might even ratify it but do nothing legislatively to put it into action. In the case of the arms treaty, the UN has not put in provision for an enforcement agency. So there is essentially no real oversight to see if participating states are in compliance and no external incentive for states to comply. Period.

As for the claim that there would be an arms registry in which all gun owners would have to register their guns, that is also not true.  The background check amendment, for example, EXPLICITLY prohibits the establishment of a gun registry. But that’s not enacted yet, thanks to the threat of a Senate filibuster.

There is evidence that in a country such as ours, gun control can be extremely effective. The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, on the episode that aired April 25th (3 days ago), had a fantastic clip on Australian gun control laws and what the U.S. could learn from it, highlighting the historical and current similarities of the two countries. Australia implemented strict gun control in 1996. There hasn’t been a single gun massacre since. An editorial written for USA Today by an Australian columnist gives a good personal viewpoint on the subject, also linking to an opposing viewpoint that argues the gun violence rate was on the decline anyway.

I recognize that there is no way to keep guns out of the hands of criminals completely, but to prevent at least some of them from attaining and possessing them is far better than nothing. Who knows how many lives that could save?

What’s happening now?

In light of the various incidents of gun violence, the issue of gun control has been brought into the national limelight. To name a few examples:

—U.S. Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords, an Arizona Democrat, was shot in the head by a man who was attempting to assassinate her, wounding 13 and killing 6 others, in January 2011. She survived, but has since retired from Congress. She even wrote a letter for the New York Times (April 18th, 2013) in the wake of the failed vote in the Senate.

—Aurora, Colorado: In July 2012, a masked gunman, James Holmes, shot nearly 70 people in a movie theater, killing 12.

—Sanford, Florida: In February 2012, Trayvon Martin, a 17-year-old African American, walked out of a convenience store and was shot and killed by George Zimmerman. Zimmerman claimed self-defense under Florida’s “stand your ground” law, which effectively allows you to shoot someone if you feel you are in imminent danger. By all evidence, Martin was holding a bag of Skittles and a soft drink and posed no threat to Zimmerman.

—Newtown, Connecticut: In December 2012, 20-year-old Adam Lanza shot and killed 26 students and staff at Sandy Hook Elementary School before killing himself.

This is only a small sample of gun violence that has occurred in recent years: school shootings, public massacres, suicides, homicides. The level of gun violence has not escaped the notice of lawmakers.

A poll shown that 90% of Americans support expanded background checks. Despite this, the threat of a filibuster by Republicans in the U.S. Senate last week prevented a vote on an amendment for a gun control bill that would expand background checks. The bill was introduced by Senator Manchin (a Democrat from West Virginia) and Senator Toomey (a Republican from Pennsylvania)—it was a bipartisan bill (rare in Congress these days). Senator Manchin, on his website, encourages all Americans interested in this issue to read the bill.

Why, then, if 90% of Americans support expanded background checks, did the filibuster succeed? For each amendment related to the gun control bill, including the background check expansion amendment (there were eight others along with it that also fell short), 60 votes were required to pass it. Before voting on a bill, the Senate must agree on how many votes will be necessary to pass the bill. 60 votes is a high threshold—it is a tall order, especially in a Congress that is heavily divided along party lines. A good explanation for this can be found here.

If 60 votes had been reached, a filibuster would have ensued. The voting numbers in favor for each amendment hovered close to 60 but never reached it—the background check amendment failed with 54 in favor, 46 against. (Senate Democratic Leader Harry Reid voted against it, despite the fact that he supports it, but that was solely a strategic move—it will allow him to bring up the amendment again.) There are now louder calls for filibuster reform in the Senate.

The NRA and others involved in lobbying for guns and against gun control have a lot of money, which has been used to influence members of Congress. As Gabby Giffords pointed out in her New York Times article, many of the Senators fear the NRA and gun lobby and gave in to cowardice. (This did not sit well with many right-wingers, who don’t give a damn that she has been personally affected by gun violence.)

It is amazing that a minority—let’s face it, the gun lobby IS a minority—should have so much power.

Where does that leave the rest of us?

I feel for Senator Reid, who was faced with a difficult decision in bringing up these votes to the floor. He had to choose between asking for a threshold of 60 votes for each amendment, which is difficult to reach at best, or 51 votes (simple majority) and risk making it easy for pro-gun amendments to the gun control bill. In this political landscape, this is essentially a no-win situation.

The fight for reasonable gun control is not over yet. I don’t think it will happen until a new generation of Congressional members comes into office.

We’ve got a long way to go.

(Author’s aside: On a semi-relevant note, you should read this article listing the reasons why last week was a horrible week. Warning: Foul language afoot. But it’s more than justified.)

The Wicked President of the North [Korea] and the art of threats

If you have been watching or reading the news lately, you will certainly have heard about North Korea’s increasing aggressiveness. It has recently declared war on South Korea — in official terms, it is redundant, because the state of war between the two never technically ended, even if there hasn’t been much violent conflict between the two in the past sixty years. The violent part of the conflict ended with a ceasefire, but a peace treaty was never signed to officially finish it.

Normally, South Korea, along with many of its allies, the United States included, has dismissed the North’s threats. But of late, it seems that these are being taken more seriously. Why? What’s changed?

In this post, we’ll talk about the art of threats and how threats work. This is an application of our discussion on power in the September 24th, 2012 post of this blog. We’ll start by briefly looking at why international relations players make threats, discuss the circumstances under which they are effective, and then look at the present situation with North Korea as an example.

Why make threats?

In international relations parlance, threats can be used for the purposes of coercion or deterrence.  Coercion usually refers to inducing someone to do what you want them to do; deterrence is inducing someone to not do something. Threats can be generally defined as spoken or written warnings given by a party or parties of the execution of military, political, or economic action (in other words, a show of hard power) on a second party or parties if the latter does not meet certain conditions; these conditions may be either implicit or explicit.

Threats convey more than what the threatening party is asserting they will do. It is a very aggressive action in itself.  It is supposed to signal a couple of things. One, that the threatening party (the aggressor) is serious about carrying out their threatened action(s) in order to attain a particular set of desired circumstances. Two, that the aggressor actually has the capability of carrying out the threat; “capability” here means different things, depending on the nature of the threat.

Of course — and I am semi-joking here — a country might also make threats because the country’s leaders are batshit crazy and want to stir up trouble…

When are threats effective?

Defining effectiveness

First of all, let’s attempt to define “effectiveness”, because without a definition, the discussion that follows will not hold much meaning. One could say that it is how successful the threat is in helping the aggressor reach its goal(s), with success being the actual reaching of the goals. This is somewhat vague, although it allows for a kind of spectrum of measurement — for example, a threat can be only partially effective if the desired circumstances are only partially attained. Gradations are necessary in considering effectiveness of an action, because rarely is anything ever fully effective.

What should be kept in mind with this definition, however, is that it implies that the threat must be the cause of reaching the desired set of circumstances. It is in fact possible for those circumstances to be reached in spite of the threat, rather than because of it. In that case, the threat itself wasn’t the cause of attaining those circumstances. Furthermore, it is also possible to attain the desired circumstances along with other circumstances that are undesirable for the aggressor. To demonstrate this latter point, let’s use an example of a medication. Say you are taking a medication to get rid of a migraine. The medicine works and gets rid of your migraine. You could say that the medicine was fully effective in reaching your goal of not having a migraine. However, the medicine has a side effect of making you dizzy, which makes it impossible for you to do what you need to do. Could you still then say that the medicine is effective? In order to answer this, you must think about why you wanted to get rid of the migraine. They’re painful. They interfere with your life and make you feel miserable. The bottom line is that you want to get on with your life — which the dizziness prevents. In that case, the medicine got rid of one problem only to give you another that gives you the same results as before — you still can’t do what you need to do.

For me, I think a better way to phrase this definition effectiveness for the purposes of this discussion is the degree to which the threat in question can be attributed as a cause in attaining the aggressor’s goals. This still allows someone studying the causal effects of the instance of a threat to measure based on evidence provided, requires study of the side effects, and allows for the inclusion of the threat’s interactions with other factors in reaching the ultimate result. It also removes the issue of bias that measuring “success” often involves.

What makes a threat effective?

If a threat must induce someone to do what you do what you want or not do what you don’t want (or a combination thereof), then effectiveness will be measured by the degree to which the threatened party acts in accordance with the threat to produce the aggressor’s desired set of circumstances. I say this because although one party will threaten another to coerce them into or deter them from a specific action, the real intent is often to prevent the consequences that would result in undesirable circumstances for the aggressor.

Let me give an example. If Country X threatens Country Y with military action if Country Y uses a nuclear missile on Country X’s Military Base 1, but Country Y uses non-nuclear missiles to destroy Military Base 1 instead, the result is the same — the ultimate goal of Country X was to prevent Country Y from destroying Military Base 1, not necessarily to prevent them from using nuclear weapons. Country Y knows this and is just playing a game of semantics. In other words, the threat from Country X was not effective.

So why was the threat ineffective? There are several possible reasons, which could be a singular or a combination of following: 1) Country Y does not believe that Country X has sufficient capability and/or the will to carry out the threat; 2) Country Y believes that they could easily overcome Country X’s military forces — either alone or with allies to back them up; 3)  Country Y knows that Country X can and will carry out the threat but gains more from destroying the base than being deterred. 4) Country X had incomplete information on Country Y’s motives.

Oops, I almost forgot this one: 5) The leaders of Country Y are batshit crazy and want to stir up trouble. I’ll label this as “The Irrational Human Factor”.

This illustration highlights a few things:

—Effectiveness of the same threat depends heavily on who is threatening who. A country like Vanuatu threatening a country like Kiribati is probably more effective than Vanuatu threatening China. (Not that this would ever happen, this is just a hypothetical…many of these South Pacific countries do not have military forces; those that do have a tiny military compared to many other countries and are generally peaceful anyway. On an unrelated side note, I really want to go see the South Pacific countries like Vanuatu and Kiribati.) Not only that, but Vanuatu is closer to Kiribati than it is to China; geography often makes a difference in many military action-based threats. Many times effectiveness depends on one country’s perception of another, usually either based on current information or prior interactions. Sometimes the aggressor purposefully hides their true motives, making it harder for the threatened party to judge how serious the threat is.

—Incomplete information on either side can make the difference in the choices being made. Country X might not have known the full motive behind why Country Y wanted to destroy Military Base 1 before making the threat (which includes The Irrational Human Factor). If this was the case, then they might have chosen the wrong tack to take before resorting to threats; a more diplomatic method might have proved more effective. Conversely, Country Y might not be fully aware of Country X’s capabilities and so might have believed they were incapable or unwilling based on incomplete intelligence, thereby allowing them to believe that they would easily win in any violent conflict.

Like the boy who cried wolf: North Korea and its arsenal [of nuclear threats]

(Author’s note: I apologize for my humor, which seems to be rapidly worsening as this post continues.)

North Korea has engaged in what is frequently referred to as “saber-rattling”. It refers to making an empty threat. Long story short, the worst that has happened with them is that other countries have kept a wary eye on them.

North Korea is a very poor country and although they talk a big game, there was little evidence they had the resources to follow through.

But now there is increasing international attention on North Korea’s threats. Why? Because they are now starting to back their threats with actions. There have been opinions such as this one which assert that a lot of the threat has been embellished by the media and/or by the U.S. government’s muscle-flexing by increasing the number of warships and B52s in the Pacific region.

But I’m not convinced that’s entirely the case. Let’s recap what has happened over the past few weeks:

—North Korea has cut off the emergency line of contact between the North and the South and declared the 1953 armistice with South Korea invalid

—Allowing South Koreans to leave the Kaesong complex, an industrial complex jointly run by the North and South, but not to re-enter

—Successful testing of a nuclear weapon this past February, despite China’s advice against it and UN admonitions

—Approval of a nuclear attack on the U.S.

These are not exactly small steps here. Does this mean that war is imminent? Maybe, maybe not.

Kurt Campbell, head of the Asia Group and former assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, doesn’t think it is, stating that the North Koreans know how to walk up to the wire without tripping it. Even amid all the nuclear rhetoric, Kim Jong-un has shown signs that he is starting to focus on economic reform as a priority.

But there is still a lot that we do not know. The nature of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program largely remains a mystery, although the NY Times has compiled a comprehensive timeline on what is known. It is said they have weapons that are fueled by both plutonium and enriched-uranium. Although it is highly doubtful that the nuclear weapons that North Korea has in stock are capable of reaching the U.S. mainland or even Guam (a U.S. territory), there are those who caution that one wrong step could lead to war.

Furthermore, I worry that the situation with North Korea is like the story of the boy who cried wolf. They’ve made a ton of false alarms in the past, but what happens if one day it turns out to be not-so-false? Rogue nations are called rogue for a reason: They do not follow the rules. At least with countries like China, which frequently duck out from under international expectations, they are seeking to change the status quo through relatively more peaceful means (i.e. economic, cultural).

Let’s just hope it doesn’t come to that.

Victory 2012 and a cold shower

This past Tuesday, November 6th, the long and arduous road of the journey that is a presidential campaign came to an end. It was a nail-biter, to be sure. To be perfectly honest, after the polls closed, I was sitting at my desk at home, feeling extremely anxious and doing my best not to look at the results just yet, trying to work on my novel for National Novel Writing Month. (What? I’m not just a policy wonk…I’ve been doing creative writing since I could write.)

In the end, Barack Obama emerged the winner, gaining a second term for the presidency. Now America could go to the locker room for a cold shower. But the shower has done little to cool down hot tempers and emotions in the immediate aftermath.

The results surprised many. For me, personally, it was surprising that the race was not as close as it was purported it would be. Obama came out quite a bit ahead. I wouldn’t call it a landslide, but it was definitive; Obama got both the majority of Electoral College votes and popular votes. Click here to view the numbers for the presidential race as well as all of the House, Senate, and gubernatorial races.

For those of you who might not be very familiar with the way the U.S. president is elected (my international readers, mostly), here is a brief lesson. In the U.S., the president is not directly elected by the people. There is an intermediate body called the Electoral College. There are 538 “votes” in the electoral college; the number of votes for each state is determined by population (save for D.C., which may have no more than the smallest number of votes that another state has). A state’s votes goes towards the candidate who has the most popular votes in that state. For example, Obama got more popular votes in the state of Florida (my home state) than Romney, so Florida’s 29 Electoral College votes went to Obama. (Incidentally, Florida wasn’t decided until after Obama had already won.) In order to become president, a candidate needs to get a majority (270 votes, in this case). With this system, however, it is possible for a candidate to get the needed number of electoral votes but have fewer popular votes than another candidate. There have been disputes in the past because of this.

But in this case, there was no question. Obama won.

Obama was able to outraise Romney by the end of the campaign. Much of his funding came from everyday voters, many of them contributing $5 or $10. Romney was getting most of his money from super PACs (political action committees). PACs are committees that work to elect or defeat a particular political candidate. A super PAC is slightly different in that they can raise unlimited amounts of money.

Many people are not happy about this. Many people feel Romney or one of the third party candidates would have been a better option than Obama. I will admit that Obama has failings, some of them rather significant (the drone attacks in Pakistan among other places, for example). But I felt he was infinitely better than the other candidates on domestic policy; I wasn’t terribly impressed with any candidate’s foreign policy this time around.

Despite what people say, I do think that electing Obama was the right choice. I think it gives him a chance to improve and change from the first time around. In my mind, elections in which an incumbent is up for re-election subject the incumbent to accountability. Even if they win, their failings are exposed and gives them incentive to work on it. Of course, being politicians, there is always the risk that they will spout rhetoric on improvement but then once elected, do nothing to back up those words.

But I think this needed to happen. I think Obama’s victory this time around was necessary to heal the horrible divide between the Republicans and the Democrats and perhaps open the way for some other parties. Some are arguing that the status quo could be reaffirmed with this election, but I don’t agree.  Let me explain why.

I believe that this was a wake up call for both the GOP (a nickname for the Republican party that stands for “Grand Old Party”) and, to a smaller extent, the Democratic party, even if neither wants to admit it. After all of the controversial comments on rape and abortion, on the inconsistencies demonstrated by many in the Republican party, many voters got turned off and, I suspect, went with the man they know: Obama. In talking with some people, I’ve found that many who cast their vote for Obama were doing it to vote against Romney rather than actually vote for Obama.  On top of that, the GOP lost some seats in the Senate, where they already have a minority. The House is still dominated by the GOP, but

But here’s how I know that both parties have an awareness that things need to change and to ACTUALLY change, not just rhetoric. From my seat here in Washington, I’m already seeing some shifts. Speaker of the House Boehner and President Obama are already trying to work out compromises on issues like Obamacare and the budget. It looks promising.

Let me put in the obligatory disclaimer: Please don’t get me wrong. Healing the fissure is not going to happen right away. And I could be wrong. The status quo could be reaffirmed and things will only worsen.

The hate I am seeing on the internet from all sides is astounding and frankly disturbing. You think the rest of the world thinks us Americans foolish for who we elect? Not as much as they find us foolish for our squabbling over who we elect. I even saw hateful comments directed at people from other countries who tried to put in their two cents’ worth. In my mind, that is taking it way too far.

There are tons of theories and explanations and suggestions and studies about why Obama won and Romney lost. But it doesn’t have to be complicated. I believe Romney was too much for many people to stomach on an ideological basis. I was not impressed with his ignorance (i.e. Syria is NOT Iran’s route to the sea!), his policies (i.e. I agree Iran should not be building nuclear weapons–I think NO ONE should–but I’m not in support of going to war with them over it AT ALL), or his track record in business at Bain Capital.

For me, the confirmation of this choice was starkly clear when I read that Romney had his staff’s campaign-related credit cards cut off (now that they were unemployed) in the middle of the night after his loss as they returned to their homes all over the country. Someone tried to argue with me that it might have been Romney’s staff that called for the cutoff and that Obama would have done the same thing, but I don’t believe that for a second. Romney was so sure that he was going to win that he did not even prepare a speech in the event that he lost. I see very little chance that Romney would have told his staff to cut off the credit cards if he had lost, considering he was so sure of his victory. And Romney’s a businessman. I doubt he let his staff take ultimate charge of the campaign’s finances; I’m certain he was the one calling the shots there. Furthermore, I don’t believe Obama would have done the same thing. He grew up without having a lot of money; I cannot see him cutting off the people who helped him like that without notice.

And before you run off to tell me how biased I am against Republicans, I will tell you that I liked John McCain in the previous election cycle. I wasn’t impressed with his policies or with his pick of Sarah Palin as a running partner, but at least he was respectable. He fought for our country and was a POW for a long time. And I believe that he believed he was doing the right thing. The fact that Mitt Romney flip-flopped all the time told me he did not put much stock in his own policies; it seemed to me that he just stated what he thought people wanted to hear at the moment. And his track record at Bain disgusts me. I have no respect for him in the slightest.

I think that the initial cold shower wasn’t enough. I think that America needs to take another cold shower, immediately followed by a hike in the tundra of Siberia in the dead of winter. (I lived in Siberia, thank you very much, so I can tell you that it is COLD.) Because (pardon the pun) we need to chill out and cool down. Nothing gets done effectively when emotions are running hot and high.

I hope that this election signals a coming change. I really do. At this point, I think it depends on how much our federal elected officials consider the legacy they want to leave for their successors and the people they serve versus the gain they want for themselves. Will they remember? I don’t know, but to my fellow Americans I say this: Let’s be there to remind them, shall we?

Sino here on the dotted line, please: China, Sinophobia, and U.S. public debt

[Author’s note: To make this blog easier to read, I’m going to start putting links to sources and articles in indicated words and phrases throughout my blog posts instead of simply putting in the entire URL. I have made it so that these will open in new tabs upon clicking, so you can refer to both this blog and the articles I’ve linked without interruption. –Danya]

Let’s talk about one of my favorite countries of study in international relations: China.

China is one of my favorite countries to study for so many reasons: historical, political, cultural, linguistic. From an international relations standpoint, China is a fascinating study because it is unique.

I wrote my undergraduate thesis on controversial topics in contemporary Chinese foreign policy. I’m not an “expert”, per se, but I can definitely say I know something. I at least know enough that I have been able to establish an opinion well-grounded in and backed by evidence.

I’ve noticed a lot of smack-talk among the U.S. presidential candidates about China’s holding of U.S. public debt. Romney criticizes Obama for the amount that China holds in U.S. debt. (For more details, visit this page on the usa.gov website.) For the record, China has held much of our debt since long before Obama was ever in office.) Obama criticizes Romney for taking away jobs from Americans by exporting jobs to China, as well as other countries like Mexico, when Romney was the head of Bain Capital. I’ve heard a similar kind of talk about Russia, especially from Romney and his running partner for vice president, Paul Ryan. It annoys me to hear such talk of both countries because I find it is done excessively, obnoxiously, and non-diplomatically, though I won’t deny there are legitimate criticisms.

I’m going to attempt to clarify in today’s post what that’s all about and to what degree their concerns are valid. I’ll start by talking about the roots of U.S. Sinophobia and follow it up with an explanation on what it means to owe China for both the U.S. and China.

Roots of Sinophobia

There have been a lot of studies done on the effects of China’s holdings, because China is currently the largest foreign holder of U.S. debt at about $1.2 trillion (see here for a list of foreign holdings as of January 2012). That’s slightly more than the debt owned by U.S. citizens, which is just under $1 trillion. It’s said that Japan will soon overtake China, but even so, the fact that we owe China so much is a big deal.

But why?

There are quite a few reasons. One is that China has the second largest economy in the world; it will not be long before it overtakes the U.S. This is terrifying to many who work in the U.S. federal government, as it will indicate a loss of an economic edge and therefore power.

Another is that China is not considered to have a true democracy. It has elections, but considering that China is a one-party state, that doesn’t mean too much. But I will argue that China is communist in name only. Entire books have been written on this subject, but to summarize: Under Deng Xiaoping in the 1990s, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union, China transitioned to a more capitalist economy, although there is no question it is still at least semi-managed. Communist regimes have managed economies, meaning that the government has strict control over the distribution of resources. Enough people are living in the U.S. that grew up during the Cold War that there is still a dislike and fear of communism.

In my thesis, I argued that China doesn’t abide by international expectations as formed by current international laws and standards; it seeks to fulfill its foreign policy aims—which largely related to China’s development—by not playing by the rules. What is frustrating for many is that these methods of avoiding the rules have proven to be effective for China’s economic development and growth. The dominant school of development is neoclassical in nature; China does not follow these edicts. A good way to get a sense of what neoclassical development looks like is to read the Washington Consensus, written in 1989 as a standard guide for developing countries. My economic development professor was a heterodox economist, so my view of neoclassical approaches to development is rather negative, but the evidence out there indicates that neoclassical approaches are not very effective or useful. “One-size-fits-all” approaches rarely are.

Yet another reason is the debate surrounding the value of China’s currency, the yuan or the renminbi (RMB). (I’ll stick with yuan, it’s shorter.) Many proclaim that China’s currency is undervalued. You might be wondering, “What the hell does that mean?” China’s currency, in the past, was strictly “pegged” to the U.S. dollar; today it is different, as I’ll explain in the paragraph after this one. That is, the yuan’s value was always kept to a certain conversion rate, a little more than 8 yuan to the dollar. This is called a pegged or managed currency regime. Such currency regimes can be good in preventing price and currency value shocks. However, it also means that monetary policy is very limited, as the Chinese Central Bank must maintain the yuan’s value by reducing or increasing the money supply as dictated by fluctuations in the dollar. (Quick Lesson in Monetary Policy 101: Assume you are the Central Bank of China. You must maintain yuan’s value relative to the dollar by adjusting the domestic money supply–that is, the amount of yuan in circulation. If the dollar’s value increases, you must maintain the value of the yuan by shrinking the money supply so that the value of the yuan increases with it, maintaining the status quo. Think of it this way: the less yuan available, the more valuable it is.) Okay, so what? “So what” is that when you keep your currency artificially low, it can cause a few problems. For one, it is considered giving yourself an unfair advantage in international trade, because it means your products cost less; for example, when the yuan’s value was 8 yuan to the dollar, a 24 yuan item would cost $3, which is considered “cheaper” because it takes less dollars to purchase that item. This is called “purchasing power”. (See why so many things are made in China?) Another problem is that the lower value has a negative impact on domestic economic activity, because it means things are more expensive at home.

Another thing to keep in mind is that the yuan no longer has a “hard” peg. It has changed into what is called a “crawling peg”, which means that the yuan is allowed to float within a certain value band compared to the dollar determined by the Central Bank of China; the yuan’s value is not allowed to fall or rise beyond that range. It is a hybrid currency regime that is known as a “managed float”. This gives the Chinese government a little more flexibility in monetary policy but at the same time continue to have the benefits of a pegged currency.

A lot of studies conducted by economists have shown that the yuan is either at approximately the right value or not as grossly undervalued as many policymakers claim. The differences in these conclusions depend on the methods by which the results were attained (there are many theories and approaches to the study of currency value) and the availability of  verifiable, accurate data—if data is available at all. (I can tell you from personal experience that finding data, let alone good data, is usually a very large problem for those who study anything related to contemporary China.) A couple have even argued that the yuan is in fact overvalued and while parts of their argument are valid, their analysis is generally based on the level of reserves possessed by the Chinese government and, in my mind, leaves out a lot of other relevant factors.

With all of these combined, there is a strong Sinophobic sentiment among many American policymakers, some of whom have influenced American voters to think in a similar vein. The bottom line is this. They are afraid of China because China has shown time and again that they are capable and willing to break the rules to get what they want—and they often successfully get away with it with little reproach, though not always. Think back to the blog post I made about hard and soft power. China is a significant wielder of hard power—that is, economic power—and they have proven that they can use it effectively. People tend to put more value into the tangible, so for them, China has both bark and bite.

What owing China means for both parties

The fact that American policymakers have been putting a large egocentric focus on the problems caused by China’s enormous holdings of U.S. debt makes people forget that it goes two ways. China does not go unaffected. But how does it affect both the U.S. and China? And what implications do these effects have?

I agree that it isn’t good, in the long term, to have such a high debt. The burden gets passed from generation to generation and puts a drain on the economy. This is for any and every country, not just the U.S. (Has anyone been paying attention to what’s happening in Greece? If not, I suggest you look it up. Or perhaps I will do a future blog post on it after some upcoming events. But until then, read this and this. And while you’re at it, this. The resolution of the Greek issue going to be important in determining the future of the European Union.)

The main concern for many U.S. policymakers is that China’s debt holdings will allow it to have an “edge” over the U.S., allowing them to more easily get what they want in their dealings with the U.S. This perceived edge comes from the belief that China could cash in on large amounts of debt and crash the value of the dollar.

As someone who has studied this area of Chinese foreign policy, however, my opinion is that this does not have much merit, though that is not to say there is no foundation for this fear. Fear of foreign creditors is not by any means a contemporary phenomenon; it dates back to ancient times.

A fantastic 2009 article was published in the academic journal International Security by Daniel Drezner surveying the validity of the fears that China will have greater influence due to oversize holdings of U.S. debt. His opinion can be summarized in two sentences taken directly from the introduction of the article: “To paraphrase John Maynard Keynes, when the United States owes China tens of billions, that is America’s problem. When it owes trillions, that is China’s problem.” This is a 40+ page-long article, so I’ll give you some of the highlights. Drezner comes to the conclusion that China as a foreign creditor has not been able to translate its capital gains into major foreign policy gains; most of the gains made are rather minor. There are several reasons behind this, mainly that financial leverage is extremely limited in great power politics since the creditor and debtor, being great powers, will have similar vulnerabilities, if indeed they have any; there is therefore a low cost of retaliation should the creditor attempt to coerce the debtor into committing to a foreign policy action that the debtor doesn’t necessarily want. Another reason is that there are always other sources of credit; China is hardly the only country the U.S. could attain credit from.

It would be a stupid move on China’s part to pull the plug on offering credit to the U.S. This is the when-the-U.S.-holds-trillions-it-is-China’s-problem part of Drezner’s conclusion. There are several reasons for this. The first is that China, as a creditor with its currency effectively pegged to the U.S. dollar, would not want to cash in on what the U.S. owes it precisely because the dollar would crash. China cashing in on U.S. debt would lower the dollar’s value because the demand for the dollar has decreased; the dollar’s value (think of it as the “price” of the dollar) is determined by supply and demand, just like the price of any other item. When a country holds another’s country’s debt, the debt is usually denominated in the debtor country’s currency. In this case, China holds U.S. debt in U.S. dollars—not in yuan. So yes, policymakers are right that such a move on China’s part would devalue the dollar, but they are wrong that it would be an action of any worth or benefit to China. It is not as much of a deal if China decided to lower its holding by smaller amounts, but large amounts (in the hundreds of billions, for example) would probably end in disaster for both countries.

You might be asking, “But wouldn’t China want to have a lower currency value? Didn’t you just write that China is keeping its currency’s value low for exports and all that?”

Of course I wrote that. It is definitely true; I’m not coming back to tell you any different. But in this case, the answer is a definitive no, even in accordance with what I told you. Although China is keeping its currency relatively low to capitalize on the advantage of cheaper exports, a currency that is too low is extremely problematic. China knows it and would never let the yuan crash to such levels. Let me use an example of inflation as an illustration, because inflation, while it isn’t (completely) what determines the exchange rate between currencies, it is a measure of a currency’s value at home. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, Hungary’s currency at the time, the pengő, experienced rampant hyperinflation—to the point where it cost millions of pengő to buy a loaf of bread; the Communist Party replaced the pengő with Hungary’s original currency, the forint. True, this is an extreme example. But it gets my message across: The moral of the story is that if your currency is too low in value, it is much harder to have a thriving economy at home (in Hungary’s case, completely impossible), let alone do well enough to be able to export. (The reverse is also true: it is not necessarily good for a country to have a currency which has a value that is too high, because it would mean that its exports are too expensive for others to purchase.)

As I said earlier, China’s ownership of U.S. debt is a problem with effects that go two ways. The U.S. has the problem of paying off its debt to China in a timely but responsible manner; China has the problem of holding such a large amount of U.S. debt that disengagement, should it be so desired or necessary, will be difficult without causing currency shocks.

Implications of Sinophobia

While smack-talking China is nothing new for U.S. elected officials, it is something that I find tasteless. I was annoyed with Paul Ryan talking about Syria during the vice presidential debate last week and him constantly bringing up Russia when it was not even closely related to the point he was supposedly trying to make. I see no good coming out of discourse such as that. Sure, it’s an easy rallying point around which support can be gathered. Throw in spices of truth into the broth of lies and everyone will automatically assume its a truth broth, simply because there is truth in it. Propoganda seems to play on defining perceptions to be black and white: concepts of good and evil, right and wrong, fair and unfair, true and false. It is meant to encourage you to be part of and/or lend support to a team, a group, an organization, or a country dedicated to a cause.

Here’s what can be so dangerous about such talk. If citizens are convinced that even part of what their elected officials say is the truth—maybe it is validated by the media, for example—they are more inclined to believe anything else these officials say. But we are human. No one ever always lies, but no one ever always tells the truth, either. And people forget that. We citizens are often in awe of these officials who have come so far and done so much. Even if we don’t like them or don’t agree with them, we are in awe of them, one way or another. (Of course, it might be awe that they are an incompetent person who has made it so far, but because they have done so, they are nevertheless raised to an elite status.) So if citizens take their leaders’ words as gospel truth, they are not going to look for additional information elsewhere. They believe they know the truth and are therefore themselves informed. Psychological studies have shown time and again that even when presented with evidence that clearly contradicts a long-held belief, individuals will hold on to those beliefs regardless.

Do you see where I am going with this?

That is what makes propoganda so effective. When you come to believe something is true, it is hard to change your views to be in accordance with the evidence that proves otherwise. Propoganda plants those psychological seeds.

So the more that U.S. politicians talk badly about China, the less people will be inclined to see any good in China. Combine this with the fact that we humans tend to judge the people of a country by its government—if you don’t believe me, go abroad and talk to people and you will learn very quickly that this is the truth—and the U.S. will have even more obstacles in dealing with China, because there will be an instilled unwillingness on the part of the U.S. to understand since the U.S. believes that they already understand. Is this phenomenon conscious? Chances are it’s not (unless you’re determined to hate others). Nevertheless, it contributes to the Sinophobia that underlies the attitude of many—certainly not all—Americans.

My obligatory disclaiamer: Please remember, I am talking about generalities here. I’m not saying this is the effect that happens to every single American. (Obviously not…I wouldn’t be writing this, would I?) But at the same time, this is something that does actually happen. If you look in history, there are many examples of widespread hatred based on misinformation and misunderstanding. (World War II concentration camps, anyone?)

My point is that Sinophobia only serves to hinder relations. It does not help or change anything for the better. I think we need to step up and try to understand China. That doesn’t mean we have to agree with everything we do. (Oppression and social control are things that shouldn’t be taken lightly.) But don’t vilify the country for every little thing that it does. And to U.S. policymakers: do you remember whose fault is it that we have so much debt in the first place? That’s right. It’s ours. If we didn’t have so much overall debt in the first place, China wouldn’t have so much debt of ours to hold…

Speak soft but carry a large stick: Hard power versus soft power

President Theodore Roosevelt’s advice regarding diplomacy was this: speak soft, but carry a large stick.

Of course, he was adding his own corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, posed by President James Monroe in 1823 and authored by the Secretary of State at the time, John Quincy Adams.

For those who do not know, a transcript of the Monroe Doctrine can be read here: http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=23&page=transcript. If English isn’t your first language, it might be a little difficult, because it’s older, more formal English. (As a former English teacher, I still recommend trying to see what you get out of it!) In short, it is one of the longest-enduring tenets of American foreign policy, stating that any European power that attempts to colonize North or South America will be viewed as an act of war against the U.S. that will result in U.S. (military) intervention.

But because of its association with a controversial aspect of U.S. foreign policy, I’m not sure if people realize just how insightful that President Roosevelt’s saying is.

What good ol’ Teddy was saying is that in approaching interactions and negotiations with other nations, soft power is needed at the forefront, with hard power to back it up.

What are hard and soft power? Heck, what is power?

Today’s discussion will be on the concept of power in international politics. Then these ideas of power will be applied to a real-life situation, so that you might understand and see better just how big of a role power has in both domestic and foreign politics.

What is power?

“Power” is a term we hear so often every day. But what is it, exactly?

There are tons and tons of definitions for it. I can’t possibly name them all here. Like sovereignty, it is such a big topic that numerous articles and even books have been written about it. Let’s name some examples of definitions that have been given for “power”: economic wealth, military might, inspiration, influence, respect…

These are all correct to a degree. But that doesn’t exactly tell us much, does it? It gives an idea of how power might manifest or be facilitated, but it doesn’t really say what it is.

Let’s take a moment to look at how physicists define power. A unit of power is equal to one joule per second. A joule is a unit of energy that measures how much energy is used or expended in applying a force of 1 newton. In turn, a newton is a unit of force, with 1 newton equal to 1 kg-m/second squared.

My physics background is limited (my science background mostly lies in chemistry and biology, as I started my college education as a biochemistry major), but I learned this in basic physics in high school.

So to make a long story short, power is energy transfer over time. And what is energy?

If you said something along the lines of “the capacity to do work”, give yourself a gold star.

Put another way, then, power is the ability to refocus energy in order to get work done.

I’d say this definition of power applies fairly well to international relations in a more abstract way. Those considered to be the most powerful nations are often seen to have the ability to accomplish their interests.

(At this point, I’ve decided I’m going to add a definitions page to this blog.)

But now the example definitions listed earlier make more sense; many confuse “power” with “instruments of power”.

What makes one state more “powerful” than another? What gives them that edge, that ability to refocus energy achieve their interests?

I’m not sure about the international relations experts in the academic world—do not get me wrong, I am not an expert (yet), that is a long time in coming and this blog is but a fun hobby for me—but in my humble opinion, I think it is due to the full set of “internal priorities” of a state, based on what I will call its “internal structure”—this is my definition of a state’s “position”. By internal structure, I mean a combination of geography, demographics, political/governmental type, form, and structure, and overall standard of living; it is what makes an individual state unique. Internal structure provides many choices for a country’s internal priorities. Of course, that does not mean that it will result in anything positive, useful or effective; in fact, it is often the case that states do not make such choices in priorities. In the study of political science in general, no matter what level you look at, the human element is often forgotten, overlooked, or simply underestimated. Governments are made by and of people; the psyche and personal circumstances of these individuals cause them to have their own priorities and interests, which frequently get reflected in a state’s priority set.

The priority set, according to my definition, of any one state is enormous: it is the aggregate of priorities of the state as a whole, not simply those of the government in authority. Of course, the government often influences the priorities of its constituents in one way or another.

The power of a state lies in the ability to redirect energy towards the use of any instrument of power in order to obtain a certain goal. These instruments include things like economic wealth, military might, social/interpersonal connections, information, technology, ideas, innovation, and education.

These things, in turn, are put into two classifications: hard and soft power.

Hard power is almost always the use of a tangible instrument of power, usually economic wealth or military might. It is visible, countable, measurable in some way. Soft power, on the other hand, is very different; generally, it is the use of intangible, more subtle instruments: good interpersonal connections that can result in favors, persuasion, the spread of ideas, general influence.

It isn’t always easy to determine whether an instrument is one of hard or soft power. Take information, for example. Because information can be recorded and is therefore tangible, some argue it is more of a hard power instrument. But information can also be hidden 0r used for persuasion, which would possibly put it in the soft power category.

Keep in mind, these are simplistic definitions; the study of power is much more complex and the lines aren’t always clear between hard and soft power.

When Teddy Roosevelt stated to “speak soft and carry a big stick”, he was using a reference to hard and soft power. Because soft power is not as tangible, states, in their appraisal of each other as help or hindrance in achieving their own interests, it is not considered as “important” or “effective” as hard power. Therefore, he advised backing soft power with hard power so that the intangible will be lent substance by something tangible, since the human mind tends to lend more importance to what is verifiable with the senses. (That’s a whole philosophical discussion in itself, one not to be held here. Not today.)

Power: There’s an app for that

Let’s take a look at the use of power and apply it to the real world. I came upon an article written back in February 2012 by current Russian president Vladimir Putin. He served as Russian president from 2000 – 2008, as prime minister from 2008 to 2012, and was elected as president again back in March of this year. I had the opportunity to view both parliamentary and presidential elections in Russia during my Fulbright grant. There were many very interesting developments. I hope to write about it sometime in another post.

The article is titled as “Быть сильными: гарантии национальной безопасности для России” [“Being Strong: Guarantees of National Security for Russia”].

In any case, here is the article in English. It is much, much shorter than the Russian version (even the title has been reduced to simply “Being Strong”), but it will give you enough to be able to see:

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/21/being_strong?page=0,0

The Russian version, for those of you who know the language, can be found here. If you can read Russian, I highly recommend it:

http://www.rg.ru/2012/02/20/putin-armiya.html

Right of the bat, you can tell a lot from the title. The use of the phrase “national security” indicates physical security and guarantees discussion of Russia’s military strength. So the focus is on hard power. By equating “being strong” with “national security”, it demonstrates Putin’s mentality that hard power is what makes a state strong, rather than soft power.

The second and third paragraphs on the first page of the English version are very revealing:

“It is no surprise that some are calling for resources of global significance to be freed from the exclusive sovereignty of a single nation. This cannot happen to Russia, not even hypothetically.

In other words, we should not tempt anyone by allowing ourselves to be weak. We will, under no circumstances, surrender our strategic deterrent capability. Indeed, we will strengthen it.”

Not surprising to have such fighting words from a veteran Russian leader and former KGB agent. Putin (Russians in general, for that matter) does not mince words. He is very clear: Russia will defend its physical resources in the interest of developing the economy as a whole by taking some of those resources, putting innovative minds to work, and using the two to strengthen Russia’s military to secure it.

It is hardly a surprise that the focus is on hard power and the tangible power instruments that go with its use. Russia is a resource-rich country that for many, many years has had an economic and political habit of concentrating resources to a few key players and forcing distribution. I’m talking even before the advent of communism and the rise of the USSR and certainly after the fall of the Soviet Union.  It has resulted in uneven economic development through the different regions of the country. When you look at a city like Moscow and compare it to a city in Siberia like Krasnoyarsk (admittedly, much smaller than Moscow with a population of about 1,000,000), the difference is clear. Krasnoyarsk is developing fairly rapidly, but it is nowhere near Moscow on that front. (Despite that, I am not a fan of Moscow. I love Krasnoyarsk, which I consider my Russian home.)

This is an example of what I mean when I am talking about how a state’s position is determined by the relationship between internal priorities and internal structure. Here is another one, from the Russian version of the article (not shown in the English version):

“Приоритет: Важно обеспечить встречные потоки инноваций, технологий между ‘оборонным’ и ‘гражданским’ секторами.” [“Priority: It is important to provide counter flows of innovations and technology between defense and civilian sectors.”]

This is a really interesting policy, putting a link between defense research and development (R&D) and civilian R&D. It is common for there to be a large time gap in between the advent of military technology and innovations and the time that they find some use in the public market. Assuming such a policy will truly be upheld, it will do a lot of good for Russia; it will mean that investment in one sector could lead to innovations in the other. Talk about getting more bang for your buck. Or, in this case, your ruble. (A ruble today is worth about $0.03.) On top of that, with Russia’s incentives built into the higher education system for getting students into science, engineering, and technology career fields, innovation may not be long in coming. (In the U.S., public universities are funded by the state governments; in Russia, the federal government does the funding.)

(And for the record, for those who might be wondering about the intellectual property rights implications of such a policy…Russia doesn’t care. Really. I found no music stores with newly released albums because everyone downloads music for free online. And academic plagiarism is rampant in the universities—at least, until the last year when they have to write a thesis. But that’s just the way it is.)

But think about this: with a link like that between the civilian and defense sectors, think of how easy it would be for Russia to shift focus from one to the other according to short-term and/or long-term need. Mobilization of the military, complete with advanced equipment, could be incredibly rapid (not a small feat for a country of that size). And then when the need for a larger military ends, it would be easy to redirect focus on the civilian sector.

That ability to refocus, ladies and gentlemen, is power. In this case, hard power.

Will the imbalance between hard and soft power work for Russia in the long term? There is no real telling at this point, but I do believe in a certain kind of balance. Intimidation in efforts to deter others from taking undesirable actions with overt uses of hard power do not generally make for many allies—and who knows when Russia will need allies in the future. Not to say Russia does not have allies now, but its always better to have more than less…

Syria-ous talk

Despite my attempt at a humorous title, the Syria conflict is a very serious subject. Heck, talk of any armed conflict in general is serious. And I doubt this will be the last post I do about it.

To start, if you are unfamiliar with the events that precipitated the current conflict and the events of the war, here is a timeline from the BBC under its Country Profile for Syria: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14703995. I recommend looking at the BBC’s Country Profiles, as they are relatively brief but very informative.

I am very bothered by the fact that very little is being done about the conflict in Syria; at the same time, however, I also understand the constraints that hold sway over a lot of countries that would otherwise participate in humanitarian intervention. I do not necessarily approve of these constraints, but they are there.

This discussion will start by covering the reasons why humanitarian intervention is not so easy in today’s world. Then I will talk about the nature of the Syria conflict, what is being done (and what is NOT being done), and why it is significant.

Sovereignty: Can’t Touch This

What could possibly be so difficult about intervening in a horrible, horrible conflict in which thousands of people are dying? How is that even a question? The answer, unfortunately, is long-winded and complicated.

One of the basic tenets of today’s world order is that states–countries, if you will–are sovereign.

In simplified terms, to be a sovereign state means that the state is autonomous, that the recognized government has full authority within the borders of the recognized territory. It is an acknowledgement and acceptance on the other recognized members of the international community that a state is legitimate. To be legitimate, in turn, means to have the sole authority of governance.

The definition of sovereignty has changed over time and many academic articles and even books have been written on the subject, hence my very short and not-satisfyingly-thorough definition.

The foundation for the modern concept of sovereignty started with the signing of the treaty of Westphalia in 1648. This is considered the signal of the beginning of the current world order and a new approach to international relations. Back then, states were the main players in the international arena. Sovereignty was inviolable, almost sacred.

Of course, back then there was a standard of recognizing sovereignty in states that had only proved to be “civilized”. It didn’t stop many European states and some Asian ones from colonizing already-occupied lands. But they were not occupied by people considered civilized; some states felt it was a duty to teach these peoples how to be civilized. (“Teach” is a rather mild word here, but methods of indoctrinating civilization were often not mild.)

Now the world order is considered “universal”, by which I mean all inhabited land under the domain of a sovereign state. (As to whether the world order is universal in the political mentality of every state is subject to debate.)

In today’s world, the concept of sovereignty—whether you realize it or not—is the established measure by which we judge one sovereign state invading or interfering with the affairs of another sovereign state as morally wrong. Think of the outrage resulting from Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in the 1990s.

Ideas of legitimacy have changed, too. With the advent of widespread democracy, legitimacy, which used to be largely mutually conferred between states, is now considered to be determined by the people of a state. So when a section of the people begin to openly and violently rebel against their government for inhumane practices, it suggests that the government’s legitimacy is in question.

The question then is: at what point does a government lose legitimacy completely and thereby involuntarily relinquish sovereignty?

Herein lies the problem of humanitarian intervention for outsiders looking in. There is no general consensus on the answer to that question. Which means that the point at which intervention would be considered acceptable is uncertain and undecided. And keep in mind that humanitarian intervention is NOT the same as humanitarian aid; the former involves military forces coming into the state’s territory to stop the crisis.

There is a list of “failed states”, largely determined by international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). The 2012 list from the Fund for Peace can be found here: http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-grid2012. A state is considered “failed” when the government cannot and/or will not perform basic functions for the people. The top five failed states this year are all in Africa: Somalia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan, Chad, and Zimbabwe.

Now it is easier to see why, in the context of today’s international system, humanitarian intervention is problematic. So even when many sovereign states have their moral alarm bells ringing with the advent of a humanitarian crisis in another state, international standards meant to safeguard states from each other, get in the way.

Not only that, but what amounts to a “humanitarian crisis” is also unclear. There is no consensus on a threshold of violent, government-related deaths.

Often there will be opposition to humanitarian intervention on the part of some states because of economic interests and profitable agreements with the current regime.

To top it off even further, many countries couch their opposition to humanitarian intervention in what is known as “cultural relativism”. Essentially, this means that moral code is different according to culture; what is wrong for one culture is perfectly acceptable in another. The validity of this concept has been put into question by many academic scholars. There is a fantastic article by Amartya Sen, who deals with a lot of moral issues in international affairs, that provides good evidence against cultural relativism. I don’t remember the title offhand, but when I get the chance I’ll put it under the Recommended Resources page of this blog.

The Case of Syria

Syria, unfortunately, is another case of a dictatorial leader oppressing a revolt against his regime. The fact that thousands have already died since the conflict began last year tells me that it is well into humanitarian crisis territory. But I’m just one person, not the international community. I’m sure, though, that many other individuals around the world agree with me wholeheartedly.

Some efforts are being made to provide humanitarian aid: food, money, clothing, and other supplies needed to care for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Much of the international community has called for Bashar al-Assad’s resignation and now for action to remove him from power. Russia and China repeatedly blocked resolutions made in the UN Security Council against Syria, largely to protect economic interests there.

What disappoints me, however, is the Obama administration’s lack of a strong stance on a decisive resolution to the conflict. I am an Obama supporter, but please don’t take that to mean that I support or agree with EVERYTHING he does, because I don’t, especially in this case. I receive e-mails from the State Department everyday to keep up with things going on in international affairs. I recently received an e-mail with the transcript of remarks given by Susan Rice, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, at a Security Council meeting on Syria on August 30 of this year. I do recommend reading it. Here is the link:

http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/197077.htm

Here are some of the things that struck me the most. This passage in particular struck me as particularly telling:

“But this is not, at root, a humanitarian crisis. It is a political crisis caused by the cruelty and callousness of the Assad regime. No amount of humanitarian assistance will end the bloodshed and suffering. That day will come only once Assad has departed and a peaceful, Syrian-led transition to democracy has begun. This remains our goal—and should be the goal of all nations of goodwill. We welcome the appointment of Joint Special Representative Brahimi and fully support his efforts to end the violence and pave the way for a political transition.”

If you read the same passage I did, then you will see that something is very wrong with this statement. It IS a humanitarian crisis at root. Very often a political crisis is also a humanitarian one; I find most humanitarian crises are also political, though it is not always true the other way around. I find that denying that the political crisis in Syria is also a humanitarian one is despicable. I feel like it dehumanizes those who are suffering even more than they already are and it dismisses the horrors of what they are experiencing. I don’t know if you’ve seen the photos released by the media of the conflict, but they are stomach-turning and disheartening.

This is a conflict in which people are being killed indiscriminately. Thousands have been uprooted from their homes. Men and women alike are being subjected to sexual violence (rape). Forget personal socioeconomic security; many don’t know if they’ll live to see the next day.

I think it is disgusting to say that this is not a humanitarian crisis at root. The moment Assad started using death and bodily harm as weapons against those who do not support him represented a breakdown in any humanitarian compassion that all governments need to be effective in a positive way. In this sense, the humanitarian crisis and the political crisis were simultaneous: the government is failing to support the people, instead turning on them.

I just don’t see how it can be described otherwise.

On a different note, there is merit in the statement that no amount of humanitarian assistance will end the bloodshed and suffering.  Ambassador Rice is correct: humanitarian aid is not enough, because it is not merely a humanitarian crisis. The political element must also be handled.

Another passage:

“Mr. President, we have heard volumes today about the suffering of the innocent and the cruelty of the guilty. My country was founded on the belief that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. The Assad regime has manifestly lost whatever consent, if any, it ever had. The question is not whether it will fall; the question is when, and at what price.”

This is an official statement that shows the U.S. feels that the Assad regime has lost legitimacy. I was also glad to see that the ambassador called out (though not by name) Russia and China on blocking UN Security Council action on Syria, calling their efforts to do so “reprehensible”.

I’m also glad to see that efforts are being made at the grassroots level to improve the vitality and strength of civil society in Syria. This will prove important for the transition to a new regime. As someone interested in development within conflict zones, I think this is a very good start.

I do not think that it is enough, however. I do not think Assad will willingly step down. It will either take forced removal or death to take him out of power. I do not advocate killing him—I think, instead, he should be tried for crimes against humanity.

As a Middle Eastern state, Syria is in a geographically precarious position. The Middle East has been a minefield in terms of stability, in no small part due to natural resource possession and distribution (i.e. a lot of oil, little water). Much of the area is still in development (economic, social, political). For a lot of secular states, there is too much religion involved in governance, too much rigidity.

On my part, I do not think religion in government is necessarily so bad for largely religiously homogenous societies, because religion can provide a good moral compass as long as it doesn’t lead the government to discriminate against those who practice other religions or to treat its own people badly; it just has to be done right and there needs to be checks on getting too radical or oppressive. On the other hand, I advocate secularism for states like the U.S. because there is so much cultural and religious diversity.

I hope that, in the course of reconstructing Syrian government and society, there is cultural and religious sensitivity. No country can effectively function or progress without all the parts working well together, of which culture plays an enormous role; cultural preferences must be considered in social reconstruction.

A stable Syria will help establish stability throughout the Middle East in general. Perhaps in time it can serve as a leader and role model in the region for other Arab and Muslim nations in the Middle East. With a state that has similar cultural and religious aspects, other such countries can replicate and adapt innovations in the future Syrian system that work well. This is somewhat idealistic on my part, but I feel I have to write it, to get it out there.

For now, I just hope the violence ends soon so that the Syrian people can heal and grow strong again.

To those who have family or friends out there, my prayers are with you and with them.