I’m not well-versed in psychology by any means. I know vaguely about a couple of the major concepts, but that’s about it.
However, I know enough that ALL humans experience and process at least one emotion in their lives: fear.
Fear has been used throughout human history for many purposes, not the least of which is to demonstrate power hierarchies. This could be applied to something as large as a national government or as small as an individual family unit.
There are many ways by which to induce fear in others, but all of them involve threatening something of importance for the target. This could be someone’s life, livelihood, well-being, security…anything the target or targets value.
Terrorist groups—and I mean ANY kind, not just the religious ones—tend to use a very powerful method in their efforts to induce fear. That method is the creation of uncertain circumstances.
I’ll start with a discussion on how terrorist groups of today tend to operate in carrying out their goals, then talk about why the nature and existence of terrorist groups is evidence against international relations realist theory. This is important to talk about, because it might give you more ideas about how to look at or approach the study of international relations.
Carrying out terrorism: Method to the madness
Uncertainty might well be the most powerful source of fear. Humans are very good at physically, mentally, and emotionally adapting to difficult life situations: extreme climates, low food availability, imprisonment. This is not to say that adaptation always has a positive effect (look at kidnap or hostage victims who develop Stockholm’s syndrome), but in most cases adaptation provides security. It is far more difficult to adapt to circumstances that are uncertain, because there is no real consistency to which to adapt. We adapt more easily when we are exposed to circumstances that have a certain consistency. In the process of adapting, we process information that tells us how to adapt.
With uncertainty, the information needed is either partially or fully incomplete. False information and rumors might be available, but with no way to verify it, it is still uncertain. Without proper information, people cannot make the right decisions for themselves.
Terrorist groups will carry out violent schemes to promote uncertainty and induce fear. That fear can be used as leverage to attain a particular goal.
Look at what happened on September 11th, 2001. (There are many examples I could use from around the world, but since I lived in the U.S. at the time, it is the one that I can explain best on a more personal level.) Four different passenger airliner jets were used as missiles to destroy important buildings (save for Flight 93, where the passengers fought back and crashed the plane into a remote field). In the end, thousands were dead and both the World Trade Center towers and part of the Pentagon (headquarters of the U.S. military) were destroyed.
I hate calling this brilliant, because I think it is disgusting (I really don’t have a strong enough word), but for what they were trying to achieve, it worked beautifully. Because of the uncertainty due to the inability to get accurate or verifiable information, many people were not fully aware of what was happening and were terrified. Were more attacks going to happen? If so, where? Who was dead or hurt? Who was behind it?
Most importantly and frequently: Why?
I was twelve at the time of the attacks. I was not fully aware of what was happening in the world and why there were people out there who hated us so much they wanted to kill us. Yes, I was scared. Scared because they could and did hurt people who, as far as I could tell, had never done anything to them, even to the point of destroying themselves in the process.
This is the most literal way to show that hatred often destroys the hater.
Among its achieved affects were the sweeping changes that followed. Security tightened at U.S. airports. Racial profiling, which was already fairly prevalent, became much worse. The Patriot Act was passed. (Don’t even get me started on that filthy piece of legislation!)
Watching the flurry of decisions made in fear in the aftermath probably increased the feeling of power that al-Qaeda had already from the attacks themselves. The U.S., one of the most militarily powerful countries in the world, had had its sense of security unsettled and uprooted by a relatively tiny group.
Since that time, there has been some academic study on terrorist groups and how they function. I once read an article that postulated that terrorist groups proliferate, grow, and strength much like deadly viruses: they often lie dormant for years, waiting for the right time to strike. Once they do, they are difficult to deal with and recover from. They spread through networks used as vectors created by appealing to and recruiting from those who are most likely to relate to and support their cause.
Transnational identity
Terrorist groups often have a goal. That goal, however, depends on the group’s developed identity. Those familiar with group and social psychology and sociology will know more about the logistics and mechanisms than I do, but I can explain in more general terms how these identities are created.
People often interact and develop close relationships with those they perceive as being like them, the perception based on a conceived notion of who they are and their position in the world (in other words, based on an identity). Groups form around these commonalities, with a particular goal based on the set of those commonalities, which could be called the “group identity”.
These groups use identity to appeal to possible followers, convincing them of the group’s importance and relevancy. With every person who joins and/or supports the group in some way lends to the appearance of strength and solidarity, lending more credence to the importance and perceived superiority of the identity.
(By the way, do not confuse “identity” and “ideology”. They are NOT the same! Ideology deals with approaches and perspectives of the world or some aspect of it; identity deals with characteristics of the self. Admittedly, however, the lines between identity and ideology can get blurred or overlap in some cases.)
One key point here is that identity is fluid in its construction. Groups can form around different types of commonalities; identity is created through the ones deemed most important or valuable. Nationality, ethnicity, religion, gender, country affiliation (I distinguish this because you might be of a particular “nationality” but live in a different country)…these are all characteristics that lend themselves in forming a group identity. And frequently they can combine to make the groups more exclusive.
I wish there was a way to study how identity in terrorist groups change over time, but that would be a dangerous and ethically-contentious undertaking, since the only real way to study that is to get involved.
In any case, here is where the “transnational” aspect comes in for terrorist groups.
Depending on the terrorist group’s chosen set of commonalities—that is, their identity—they can choose to appeal to people all over the world. The assumption is that people with these commonalities will have an interest in joining and/or supporting the group’s cause, whatever that may be.
If the group gathers enough supporters in a particular geographic area outside of the point of origin, they have made another nub for the network, another point to and through which supplies, money, and information can be passed.
So why is it “transnational” and not “international”?
“International” indicates different “nations” working together. It implies that people grouped together as a country or a nation are working for the country or nation’s interests. On the other hand, “transnational” indicates a multi-national, multicultural entity that just happens to have different locations in different countries, working for a cause beyond national interests.
I think a major reason for the advent of transnational terrorist groups is globalization. People are more aware of the world than they were before. While this allows for greater understanding, it also has lead to sections of the world population to be angry and discontented with the status quo.
Against realist theory
What does this have to do with realist theory?
To be brief, realist theory stipulates that states are the main actors (for some, the only ones that matter) in the international arena. The world order is seen as tending towards anarchy, with states only looking out for themselves in a dog-eat-dog world. Any game played in the world arena is a zero-sum game, which means one country’s gain is another’s loss. It is an interest-driven theory, meaning that motivations for interaction rely on the desire to fulfill national interests. Interests can loosely be defined as goals and desires of a nation pursued within the framework of the international order.
That is a REALLY simplified way of describing realist theory, but that is the essence of it. (If you want to read more, read works by Kenneth Waltz.)
I do think that at one point, realist theory had a lot of merit; in some ways, it still does. It describes the modern beginnings of international relations as well. As I mentioned in the previous post when I discussed Westphalian sovereignty, the formalization of the concept through treaty established and reinforced the sanctity of the state as a legitimate, autonomous entity. This lends credence to realist theory for that time period.
But fast forward to today. States are no longer the only major players. You have a wealth of international institutions, such as INGOs, the UN, and the World Bank. To me, that alone is a blow to realist theory, though not enough to discredit it completely because although there is cooperation between states through these institutions, they still look out for their own interests most of all.
I may not be a realist, but I agree with the theory on the point that the world order is interest-driven.
But especially from the point of view of interests, the transnational nature of terrorist groups points to a trend of the growing importance of interests not entirely related to the state. It signals that there are issues that span beyond borders that must be dealt with.
And the difficulty in dealing with terrorist groups in today’s world order is that they are not tied down to one country in particular. They are effectively beyond any one state’s jurisdiction and the groups often use that to their advantage; they can easily travel to countries that support or sponsor them. Because of sovereignty, it is extremely difficult to get the hosting country to cooperate. That’s why the allowance of the extradition of criminals is widely varied among countries; it is an issue of sovereignty.
To extend this even further, it is because of sovereignty that the degree to which any one state participates in international agreements or treaties and follows international regulations is ultimately up the state itself. The state cannot really be forced to change behavior; there can be pressure or rearranging of incentives, but there is never a guarantee that behavioral changes will occur. In this way, the system set up continues to let states remain the main players. However, as I said before, they are no longer the only important players in the arena.
I believe the system of international order is going to continue to evolve as it has been doing since its inception; transnational issues will become more widely recognized and acknowledged as globalization progresses. Technology has played a huge role in this, allowing for the spread of ideas and making development of poorer countries simultaneously easier and harder.
Of course, there will always be those discontented with the status quo, those who will resort to violence to change it. It is, unfortunately, a part of the world we live in. Hopefully in the evolution of world order there will be developed new and better ways of improving the lives of those who are disadvantaged economically and/or socially.
Breaking the Chaos in the New World Order 